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Abstract— Adversarial attacks have been widely studied in
the field of computer vision but their impact on network
security applications remains an area of open research. As
IoT, 5G and AI continue to converge to realize the promise
of the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0), security
incidents and events on IoT networks have increased. Deep
learning techniques are being applied to detect and mitigate
many of such security threats against IoT networks. Feed-
forward Neural Networks (FNN) have been widely used for
classifying intrusion attacks in IoT networks. In this paper, we
consider a variant of the FNN known as the Self-normalizing
Neural Network (SNN) and compare its performance with
the FNN for classifying intrusion attacks in an IoT network.
Our analysis is performed using the BoT-IoT dataset from the
Cyber Range Lab of the center of UNSW Canberra Cyber.
In our experimental results, the FNN outperforms the SNN
for intrusion detection in IoT networks based on multiple
performance metrics such as accuracy, precision, and recall
as well as multi-classification metrics such as Cohen Cappas
score. However, when tested for adversarial robustness, the SNN
demonstrates better resilience against the adversarial samples
from the IoT dataset, presenting a promising future in the quest
for safer and more secure deep learning in IoT networks.
Index Terms Intrusion Detection, Adversarial samples, Feed-
forward Neural Networks (FNN), Resilience, Self-normalizing
Neural Networks (SNN), Internet of things (IoT).
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet of Things (IoT) emerges and expands over
the next several years, the security risks in IoT will increase.
There will be bigger rewards for successful IoT breaches and
hence greater incentive and motivation for attackers to find
new and novel ways to compromise IoT systems. Traditional
methods and techniques for protecting against cyber threats
in the traditional internet will prove inadequate in protect-
ing against the unique security vulnerabilities that would
be expected in the internet of things [1]. Hence security
researchers and professionals would need to evaluate existing
processes and improve upon them to create more efficient
security solutions to address the security vulnerabilities in
the emerging Internet of Things.
Managing security challenges in any network involves
three broad strategies namely prevention, detection and
mitigation. Successful security solutions for IoT networks
will need to adopt all three measures. For the scope of
this paper, we focus on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
and consider deep learning based IDS for detecting and
classifying network traffic within an IoT enviroment.
Deep learning based IDS have an advantage over con-
ventional anomaly based IDS because they help overcome
the challenge of proper feature selections [2]. However, two
major challenges of deep learning in security applications
are the lack of transparency of the deep learning models
[3], and the vulnerability of the deep learning models to
adversarial attacks [4]. For the scope of this study, we focus
on adversarial vulnerability of the deep learning models.
An adversarial attack occurs when an adversarial example
is fed as an input to a machine learning model. An adversarial
example is an instance of the input in which some feature has
been intentionally perturbed with the intention of confusing
a machine learning model to produce a wrong prediction.
Szegedy et al. [4] demonstrated how a deep learning model
for image recognition could be confused into making wrong
predictions by introducing a tiny perturbation to the image.
Other researchers [5] [6] have also proved that adversarial
attacks are equally effective against deep learning models in
network security applications such as malware detection and
intrusion detection systems.
A Self-normalizing Neural Network (SNN) [7] is a type
of deep learning model that maintains the stability of the
network during the gradient descent process. Since there is
currently no research, to the best of our knowledge, that has
been carried out to analyze adversarial attacks against Self-
normalizing Neural Networks for intrusion detection in IoT
networks, we propose to carry out our study to close out this
gap.
Our Contributions in this paper are as follows: For our
first contribution, this is to the best of our knowledge, the
first study to demonstrate the effects of adversarial samples
on a deep learning based Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
within the context of an IoT network. For our second contri-
bution we provide a comparison between the performance of
an IDS implemented with two different deep learning models
- a Self-normalizing Neural Network (SNN) and a typical
Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN) within the context of
an IoT network. In our third contribution, we demonstrate
that while the IDS implemented with FNN performs better
than the SNN based IDS with regards to performance metrics
such as accuracy, precision and recall, the SNN based IDS is
however more robust to adversarial samples. In our fourth
and final contribution, we analyze the effects of feature
normalization on the adversarial robustness of deep learning
based IDS in IoT. This is the first study to the best of
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our knowledge to demonstrate that normalization of input
features in a deep learning based IDS adversely impacts
the ability of the deep learning model to resist adversarial
attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
While previous research [6] have utilized deep learning
techniques for intrusion detection in traditional networks,
in this study, we extend this research area by specifically
applying deep learning for intrusion detection in the context
of IoT. We then demonstrate that deep learning models
used for intrusion detection in IoT can be confused with
adversarial samples.
Moustafa et al [8] in the original paper that described the
IoT dataset that we used for our experiments implemented
LSTM, SVM and RNN machine learning techniques to ana-
lyze the IoT dataset but they did not evaluate the adversarial
robustness of their machine learning models in their study.
Additionally, their study only carried out binary classification
on the dataset and the prediction output of the machine
learning models was classified as either attack or normal
traffic. We note that the usefulness of such studies prevails
for network forensic analysis use cases where it is essential
to classify the output into the various categories of attacks.
Hodo et al. [9] analyzed the threat of intrusion detection
against IoT using a very limited dataset sample of 2313
training samples, 496 validation samples and 496 test sam-
ples. The dataset also contains only DDoS/DoS traffic and
normal traffic. In a realistic IoT environment, we expect a
larger network traffic dataset with hundreds of thousands or
millions of records with a more heterogeneous attack profile
on the network. We used a dataset containing over 3.6 million
records and a more heterogeneous attack profile consisting
of 5 target labels.
Zheng [6] implemented several adversarial attack algo-
rithms against a deep learning based intrusion detection
system in a traditional network using multi-layer perceptron
Feed-forward Neural Network and compared the results from
the various adversarial attacks. The author demonstrated that
the deep learning based IDS classifier using the FNN was
adversely impacted by the adversarial samples. However, the
NSL-KDD dataset that was used was generated over a decade
ago and may not represent the type of network attack traffic
that would be expected in today’s IoT networks. Warzynski
et al. [10] also evaluated the NSL-KDD dataset by training
a FNN to classify the network packets, and then tested the
resilience of their model to adversarial examples. The dataset
used in their experiment may not represent a typical IoT
network traffic.
Based on our literature review and study of related work,
we discovered that no researcher has evaluated the resilience
of Self-normalizing Neural Networks (SNN) to adversarial
examples for deep learning based IDS in IoT networks.
Hence our study is novel and offers a useful contribution in
understanding the security of machine learning and artificial
intelligence in IoT.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND PROPOSED STUDY
Zheng [6] demonstrated that a deep learning based IDS
that could correctly identify DoS attacks with an accuracy of
93% could have its performance degraded to as low as 24%
with adversarial samples. The deep learning model used in
the study was a Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN).
FNN with deep architectures have been known to ex-
perience gradient decay, resulting in poor performance.
Klambauer et al [7] proposed the Self-normalizing Neural
Networks (SNN) which is a variant of the FNN that uses a
Scaled Exponential Linear Unit (SELU) activation function.
The performance of SNN in the context of intrusion
detection in IoT in currently not known as well as their
resilience to adversarial samples. Since no study, to the
best of our knowledge, has tested the resilience of SNN for
intrusion detection in IoT, we propose to carry out our study
to close out this gap.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
In carrying out this study, we implement deep learning
based intrusion detection systems for an IoT dataset. We then
test the resilience of the deep learning IDSes to adversarial
samples. To demonstrate this, we create our own adversarial
samples from the IoT dataset which we used in training
the deep learning models. The methods used in crafting the
adversarial samples for this study are the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [11], Basic Iteration Method (BIM)[12],
and the Projected Gradient Descent[13]. Our study considers
the following assumptions. The attacks are evasion attacks
which are launched during the prediction phase of the deep
learning model. Also, a complete knowledge of the deep
learning model is assumed, hence they are white box attack.
In this study, we do not target any specific prediction out-
come, rather we seek to confuse the deep learning classifier
to make a mistake and produce a misclassification. Hence
a reliability attack. Our expected outcome is to degrade
the performance of deep learning classifier, as measured by
various performance metrics.
Fig. 1: Solution Overview Architecture
A. Development platform and tools
We develop our deep learning code in python language
with jupyter notebook hosted in Google Colaboratory. Co-
laboratory is an interactive environment provided by Google
for writing and executing code in python and other languages
[14]. Colaboratory offers advanced GPU features, is hosted in
the cloud, and comes with several pre-installed deep learning
frameworks and libraries that accelerate the task of building
machine learning models.
B. Dataset
For our dataset, we use the BoT-IoT dataset [8] provided
from the Cyber Range Lab of The center of UNSW Canberra
Cyber. This dataset provides a realistic representation of
an IoT network since it was created in a dedicated IoT
environment, and contains adequate number of records with
heterogeneous network profiles.
The BoT IoT dataset consists over 72 million records of
network activity in a simulated IoT environment. A scaled-
down version of the dataset comprising of approximately 3.6
million records is also available and was used for our study.
A selection of the 10 best features have been provided in the
original dataset and were also used for this study. [8].
The training and test dataset have 5 output classes each
which reflect the normal traffic and the 4 types of attacks
which were carried out against the IoT network.
TABLE I: BoT-IoT Dataset Features
Feature Description
pkSeqID Row Identifier
Stime Record start time
Seq Argus sequence number
Mean Average duration of aggregated records
Stddev Standard deviation of aggregated records
Min Minimum duration of aggregated records
Max Maximum duration of aggregated records
Srate Source-to-destination packets per second
Drate Destination-to-source packets per second
N IN Conn P SrcIP Total Number of packets per source IP
N IN Conn P DstIP Total Number of packets per Destination IP
TABLE II: BoT-IoT Dataset Target Classes
Target Label Training Samples Test Samples
DDoS 1541315 385309
DoS 13201485 330112
Reconnaisance 72919 18163
Normal 370 107
Theft 65 14
C. Building the FNN and SNN deep learning based IDS
We implement two IDSes for our IoT dataset. The first
IDS is implemented using a Feed Forward Artificial Neural
Network (FNN) as shown in fig. 2 while the second IDS
is implemented using a Self-normalizing Neural Network
(SNN) as shown in fig. 3. In each Neural Network model
design, we create 3 hidden layers and 16 neurons for each
layer, giving us a total of 48 neurons in the hidden layers.
The intuition behind SNN is to keep the mean and the
variance as close to 0 and 1 respectively throughout each
layer of the neural network.
For the SNN, we use a Scaled Exponential Linear Unit
(SeLU) activation function while for the FNN we use a
Rectifier Linear Unit(ReLU). The FNN uses a basic dropout
layer to prevent overfitting and ensure better stability in the
network during the learning phases while the SNN uses an
AlphaDropout layer to retain the mean and variance at 0 and
1 respectively.
For initializing the weights, we select Glorot Uniform
initializer [15] for the FNN while we use a Lecun Uniform
Initializer [16] for the SNN.
Fig. 2: FNN Architecture
D. Generating The Adversarial Samples
We generate our adversarial samples using the Adversarial
Robustness Toolbox (ART) [17] framework which is pro-
vided by IBM and is made available for public use.
The first method we use in generating the adversarial
examples for the IoT dataset is the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM). This method performs a one step gradient
update along the direction of the sign of gradient for every
input in the dataset. [11]. The second method is the Basic
Iteration method (BIM) which runs a finer optimization of the
FGSM with minimal smaller changes for multiple iterations
[12]. In each iteration, the each feature of the input values
is clipped to avoid too large a change on each feature. The
third method is the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) which
Fig. 3: SNN Architecture
is also a variation of the FGSM attack but omits the random
start feature of the FGSM [13]. All three methods are model
dependent methods[18] and rely on the model gradient.
V. RESULTS & EVALUATION
Our first result in subsection (A) below illustrates the
impact of adversarial samples on a deep learning based IDS
implemented using a FNN for the IoT dataset used in this
paper. In our second result in subsection (B), we provide
a performance comparison between the SNN and the FNN
IDSes. In our third result in subsection (C), we compare the
adversarial resilience of both the FNN and the SNN IDSes.
Our final evaluation in subsection (D) shows the effect of
feature normalization on deep learning based IDS using the
IoT dataset.
A. Effect of Adversarial Samples on Deep learning based
IDS in IoT networks
In our first experiment, we demonstrate that the FNN
deep learning based IDS was significantly degraded by the
adversarial samples generated from the IoT dataset. After
training the IDS model, we achieve an initial accuracy of
95.1%. We then evaluate the performance of the IDS once
again using the three adversarial sample datasets that were
created in the previous section. The prediction accuracy of
the FNN IDS is reduced from 95.1% to 24% from the FGSM
adversarial samples. We repeat the experiment with the BIM
and PGD adversarial samples and achieve accuracies of 18%
and 31% respectively as shown in Fig 4.
Algorithm 1: Adversarial Testing for FNN and SNN
for Each neural network FNN, SNN do
initialize number of hidden layers L, weights w;
Add input layer, activation layer, dropout layer
for i in L - 1 do
Add Dense layer
if ANN model then
Add ReLU activation layer;
Add Dropout Layer;
else
Add SeLU activation Layer;
Add AlphaDropout Layer;
end
end
Add output layer, softmax activation layer, dropout
layer
while no of epochs not complete do
compute training and validation loss;
end
Evaluate model performance
for each adversarial attack method do
Craft adversarial samples x’
Evaluate model performance with adversarial
samples x’
end
end
Adversarial-Free FGSM BIM PGD
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Fig. 4: Effect of Adversarial Samples on FNN IDS
B. Performance Comparison of FNN and SNN IDS using the
adversarial-free IoT dataset
In our second experiment, we compare both the FNN and
SNN IDSes. The SNN IDS underperforms the FNN IDS
based on several performance metrics as shown in Fig 5. For
classification metrics namely precision, recall and F1-score,
the FNN IDS consistently outperforms the SNN IDS over
multiple experiment runs. For additional multiclassification
metrics such Copen Cappa Score and MC Coefficient, the
FNN IDS also outperforms the SNN IDS as shown in Fig 5.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of FNN and SNN IDSes
C. Comparison of Adversarial Resilience of FNN IDS and
SNN IDS
Both the FNN IDS and SNN IDS performance on the
IoT dataset were degraded by the adversarial samples which
we created. We however observe that the SNN IDS is more
resilient to the adversarial attacks than the FNN IDS as
shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6: Adversarial Resilience of FNN and SNN IDS models
D. Effect of Feature Normalization on a Deep Learning
based IDS for IoT
In our final experiment, we refrain from carrying out fea-
ture normalization on the IoT dataset. As shown in Fig. 7 &
8, both IDSes have a significantly lower prediction accuracy
on the adversarial-free dataset when the input features are not
normalized. However, their resilience to adversarial samples
is improved.
Fig 9 compares the effect of feature normalization on
various classification metrics for both FNN and SNN based
IDSes using the adversarial-free dataset. The results indi-
cate that both IDSes yield more accurate results on the
adversarial-free dataset when the input features are normal-
ized.
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Fig. 7: Effect of Feature Normalization on Deep learning
based IDS using FNN
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Fig. 8: Effect of Feature Normalization on Deep learning
based IDS using SNN
Fig. 9: Effect of Feature Normalization in Deep Learning Based IDS in IoT Networks
VI. CONCLUSION
We observe from our experiments using an IoT dataset
that adversarial samples are a real threat for deep learning
based IDS in IoT.
We created two deep learning based IDSes for an IoT
dataset using two types of neural network models - a FNN
and a SNN - and observed that both models are impacted
differently by the adversarial samples. Our experiments with
the IoT dataset show that the self-normalizing feature of the
SNN makes it more resilient to gradient based adversarial
samples.
Our results further show that feature normalization of the
IoT dataset negatively affects the adversarial resilience of
the deep learning based IDSes. When the input features are
normalized, both IDSes have better performance metrics, but
they are more vulnerable to adversarial samples.
For future work, we would like to investigate why the self-
normalizing properties of the SNN makes the SNN IDS for
the IoT dataset more resilient to adversarial samples.
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